Richard Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Richard Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gordon A. Madsen; Robert C. Cummings; Madsen and Cummings; Attorney for Respondent.
Richard Richards; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc, No. 14460.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1508
£aME*T UTAH S L 'P B C ' - '= " 
KFU 
45.9 QKlEP 
.39 
DOCKET 
URT LAW LTRRAHV 
I 
i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT Or THE STATE OF UTAH 
tICHARD RICHARDS and ANNETTE 
RICHARDS, GEORGE Q. NIELSEN 
and SHERRY NIELSEN, RONALD 
HARRINGTON and MARY HARRINGTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
PINES RANCH, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14460 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from a Judgment 
of the District Court of Summit County 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Judge 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Robert C. Cummings 
MADSEN & CUMMINGS 
320 South Third East 
P. 0. Box 1783 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RICHARD RICHARDS 
2 506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
84110 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
F I L E D 
AUG 5 " 1976 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE 
USE CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS WAS SPORADIC ONLY 
AND INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW SUCH REGULAR, OPEN, 
NOTORIOUS, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE USE AS TO 
ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION . . . . 11 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING 
THAT IN RECENT YEARS THE USE MADE OF THE 
ALLEGED RIGHT OF WAY WAS ESSENTIALLY PER-
MISSIVE AND THAT DEFENDANT HAS MADE EVERY 
ATTEMPT IT COULD TO KEEP PEOPLE FROM TRES-
PASSING ACROSS ITS LAND 24 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THIS CASE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN RICHINS 
V. STRUHS , 26 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT 
DENY PLAINTIFFS ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY 
NOR RENDER IT WORTHLESS 26 
CONCLUSION 29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Chournos v. Alkema 
27 Ut 2d 244, 494 P 2d 950 (1972) . . . . . . 3 
Cooper v. Carter Oil Co. 
7 Ut 2d 9, 316 P 2d 320 (1957) 22 
Jensen v. Gerrard 
85 Ut 481, 39 P 2d 1070 (1935) 11, 
London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Frazee 
112 Ut 91, 185 P 2d 284 (1947) 11 
Nielsen v. Sandberg 
105 Ut 93, 141 P 2d 696 (1943) . . . . . . . 29 
Norback v. Board of Directors 
84 Ut 506, 37 P 2d 339 (1934) . 11 
Richins v. Struhs 
17 Ut 2d 356, 412 P 2d 314 (1966) . . . . . 11, 
Wood v. Ashley 
122 Ut 580, 253 P 2d 351 (1952) . 29 
Zollinger v. Frank 
110 Ut 514, 175 P 2d 714 (1947). 22 
STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
25 Am Jur 2d, Easements, Section 56 . 22 
Section 78-34-1(7), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
As Amended 27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant and Respondent, Pines Ranch, Inc., referred 
to hereafter as defendant, has been sued herein by the Appellants 
hereafter called plaintiffs, in a declaratory judgment action 
wherein plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of a 40-acre 
tract of land located in Section 34, Township 1 North, Range 7 
East, Summit County, Utah, which is surrounded by property owned 
by the defendant. They allege that a "road" to plaintiffs' 
property does now exist and has for many years existed across 
the defendant's land, and that it has been used for "logging 
and general access" to plaintiffs' property. (The Complaint 
does not state who allegedly used this "road" nor the extent 
of such alleged use nor the location thereof.) Plaintiffs seek 
a declaratory judgment that they have a prescriptive easement to 
use this "road" and seek a restraining order preventing defendant 
from interferring with such use. No order to show cause or other 
preliminary proceedings were had seeking a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A motion for summary judgment made by the plaintiffs 
was argued (with supporting and opposing affidavits and memo-
randa) to the Hon. James S. Sawaya, and the motion was denied. 
Thereafter the matter came on for trial before the Hon. Stewart 
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M. Hanson, Sr., hearing the matter in Salt Lake City, beginning 
at 1:30 P.M. on January 6, 1976, pursuant to request of Court 
and stipulation of counsel, due in part to inclement weather. 
(T-2). At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendant 
moved to dismiss, and the Court took the motion under advise-
ment. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court (after all the 
evidence was in and the case had been argued and submitted by 
all parties) granted said motion. (R-31, 34-37). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The ruling of the trial court was proper; the plain-
tiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to establish an 
easement by prescription. The judgment below should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs' State of Fact is selective and in at 
least four instances is totally misleading, which will be pointed 
out initially. Additional relevant facts not mentioned in the 
plaintiffs' Brief are then set forth in this Statement of Facts 
and to some extent in the Argument hereafter. 
Plaintiffs, in the second paragraph of their Statement 
of Fact (their Brief, page 2) in its final sentence, say: "The 
property was deeded subject to any easement or right of way of 
the public, even at that time." presumably suggesting thereby 
that there was an existing easement to plaintiffs" property. 
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Although Exhibit 9-P is the deed through which plaintiffs claim/ 
and although it does contain the statement that said conveyance 
is "subject to any easement or right of way of the public, to 
use all such highways as may have been established" across said 
tract, such language is totally irrelevant and immaterial to 
this lawsuit because: 
1. The deed does not purport to declare that there 
is any right of way in fact. It says "as may have been estab-
lished". (Emphasis added.) 
2. It deals only with rights of way to which said 
tract is subject. (It does not deal with rights of way bene-
fitting said tract.) 
3. It deals only with the rights of the public. 
Although the facts of this case fail to show any such public 
right of wayf even if there were such, that could not be the 
basis of support to a claimed private right of way. In the 
case of Chournos v. Alkema/ 27 Ut 2d 244/ 494 P 2d 950 (1972)/ 
the Supreme Court of Utah held: 
"One cannot claim a right of way as a private one 
by showing that it has been used by the public; he 
must show user by himself or his predecessors of 
the way to his own lot." 
At page 3 of their Brief, plaintiffs claim that the 
plaintiff/ George Q. Nielsen, used the property for "logging". 
Plaintiffs' counsel cites no reference to the record to sub-
stantiate the claim, and indeed there is no evidence to that 
- i -
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\ 
effect unless removal of a Christmas tree constitutes logging, 
as the most that can be said from the record is that Mr. Nielsen 
occasionally cut a tree, usually at Christmas time, and presumably 
(with the exception that hereafter appears) upon his own property. 
In the final paragraph of plaintiffs1 Statement of 
Fact, it is averred that "Shortly before this lawsuit was filed, 
the defendant began interferring with plaintiffs1 access to the 
property, and the plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory 
judgment." Again no reference to the transcript is made to 
substantiate that assertion and it is misleading if intended to 
imply that defendant acquiesced or failed to object to trespass 
of defendants prior thereto. All the evidence shows that a fence 
along the western boundary of Section 34 had been in existence 
at least since 1940 (T-85) and that after—not before—the law-
suit was filed (specifically on October 4, 1975) the barbed wire 
gate in the existing fence was replaced with a chain and padlock 
by Mr. Matheson, who was a co-owner of four lots (No. 32, 33, 34 
and 35) abutting said fence and gate to the west of Section 34 
(which lots were located in the Pine Mountain Subdivision and 
were acquired by him and his partners in June 1971.) (T-66-69). 
The boundary was thus protected by fence and gate since 1940 or 
before (T-85), and the objections of defendant to trespassing 
by plaintiffs and others has been incontrovertibly of long standing. 
(T-113, 94), and it is not something that occurred just before 
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this lawsuit was commenced. 
4. Plaintiffs state at page 3 of their Brief as 
fact: "In 19 38, Virgil Smith, a resident of Summit County, 
used the property for logging and used an established roadway 
across the Curt Wilde property to remove the logs." That is 
plaintiffs1 "left-handed" way of trying to get before the Court 
a statement that was not presented in evidence before Judge 
Hanson, specifically an affidavit of one Virgil Smith, which 
was used in connection with plaintiffs1 motion for summary judg-
ment, but which was not verified or introduced or offered by 
counsel at the trial. No opportunity, of course, was afforded 
the defendant and its counsel to cross-examine Mr. Smith or to 
determine when or where or how (or even if) he logged and across 
what property, if any, he traversed in taking out his timber. 
In any event his connection, if any, to the owner of the property 
remains a mystery, and his activity, if any, cannot help them. 
In that connection, plaintiffs did move the admission 
of an affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, and the Court erroneously and 
over the objection of defendant did admit it. (T-64). Plaintiffs 
had adduced from Mrs. Gibbons1 nephew, one Robert E. Walsh, (who 
was a witness) that Mrs. Gibbons is an elderly person and has 
periods of lucidity and others of incoherence. No effort was 
made by plaintiffs to establish Mr. Walsh as an expert on mental 
conditions, and no effort was made to ascertain or prove her state 
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\ 
of mind or provide foundation as to her lucidity as of July 5, 
1974, when the said affidavit was purported to have been executed. 
Apparently, the Court below gave said affidavit no credence. 
(Otherwise, admission of said affidavit would constitute pre-
judicial error.) In terms of supporting plaintiffs' position, 
it contains but one statement, and that is: "During my lifetime, 
my family and I have had occasion to utilize the roadway into 
the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 34, 
for purposes of taking out timber, grazing sheep, picnicking 
and other purposes." (R-ll). She then continued, "The roadway 
that we commonly called Shinglemill Canyon Road was the only 
means of getting to the property described above. Other people 
used it besides me and my family, and I have specific recollection 
of having used it personally in excess of Forty (40) years." 
Nothing in the affidavit indicates when the purported 40 years 
began or ended, nor whether it was continuous and uninterrupted, 
nor in what capacity she used it. 
The testimony of Mr. Walsh, Ethel Gibbons1 nephew, was 
that he, in company with his uncle (Mrs. Gibbons' husband) went 
annually to the said area to cut a Christmas tree each year 
until 1952, and from that time on has not been on it. (He wasn't 
actually sure he went to the property in question, however.) 
(T-54). It is further important to note that plaintiff, Nielsen, 
got a deed to the subject property in 1966. He testified that 
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there was a contract of purchase of the property in existence 
as early as 1962.(T-8, 9). So there is a dearth of evidence, 
testimony or otherwise, with the exception of the nebulous 
"40" years referred to in Ethel Gibbons' inadmissible affidavit 
showing any use by the plaintiffs or their predecessors in 
interest of the purported easement or right of way prior to 
1962. There has not been a 20-year period elapse since 1962 
to the present, but in any case the activity of plaintiffs 
relating to this property has only been sporadic at best since 
1962. 
The defendant's witnesses, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Lund and 
Mr. Rogerson, all testified that the "road" running easterly 
from the gate in the boundary fence was there principally for 
the purpose of servicing an irrigation canal for the downstream 
water-rights owners (who were principally the Stevens family 
and Mr. Wilde and their predecessors). (T-25, 77, 85). In 
addition, Mr. Rogerson testified that on one occasion, the 
predecessor in ownership of 200 acres of the Pines Ranch, one 
Curtis Wilde, (who sold those acres to Pines Ranch in 1957) 
(T-83) asked permission of the defendant to take timber off the 
land one time in the year that he sold it. In doing so, he 
actually cut the "road" as such to a loading dock he built where 
he brought the logs and loaded them on to conveyances. (T-84, 85). 
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Mr. Rogerson was specifically asked, "Did the 'road1 run to 
the Ethel Gibbons property?" His response was, "It did not." 
(T-84,85). He later said the "road" ends at the loading dock 
and that is approximately 150 to 200 yeards from the plaintiffs1 
property. (T-89). Mr. Lund testified that the "road" turns into 
a "horse-trail" well before reaching plaintiffs1 property. (T-80). 
Mr. Stevens described the "road" as a "horse-trail". (T-25). Mr. 
Scott Matheson testified that the way was not honestly a road. 
(T-73). One of the plaintiffs, Ronald Harrington, testified he 
had used the "road" twice, both times occurring in 1975, and that 
the "road" narrows to a "path". (T-47). 
In short, all of the competent witnesses acknowledge 
that what was a road to service a canal and in one instance to 
provide access to load some logs cut by a predecessor of the 
defendant (not of plaintiffs) is being claimed now by the plaintiffs 
as a right of way to their property for general access, on the 
strength of two crossings on foot by plaintiff, Harrington, and 
the sporadic cutting of Christmas trees and hauling the same across 
said way by the plaintiff, Nielsen. 
The evidence further showed that in order to get to the 
gate in the said fence, one would have to cross the land formerly 
owned by the Stevens family, but subdivided in 1965 as Pine 
Mountain Estates. (T-27). In that connection, Mr. Stevens testi-
fied that if people (other than the Stevens) used that route, 
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they would have been trespassing. (T-31). He also said that 
only lot-owners and subdivision developers have keys issued to 
them, and that Mr. Stevens had given no key at any time to the 
plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen. (T-34). He testified finally that 
prior to the subdivision when the property vas owned by his family 
(then doing business ad the Brooklawn Creamery) that there was 
a gate on the Shingle Mill Road, which was locked most of the time. 
(T-38). The following questions and answers were then elicited 
at page 38 of the transcript: 
"Q. This gate now has a ,fNo Trespass" sign on it, has 
it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember whether there was a similar "No 
Trespass" sign on the gate before the subdivision? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. But the Shingle Mill Road has never, during the 
period of your ownership, has never been open to the 
public for people to needlessly go in and out, is that 
correct? 
A. No, not in the twenty-five years that we have 
owned it." 
Mr. Harrington testified that on several occasions 
between 1971 and 1975, he went into plaintiffs' property. He 
testified that he went on foot from the Weber Canyon Road except 
on one occasion he was let in the Pine Mountain Estates gate by 
someone who was there at the time he arrived and drove his car to 
the boundary fence separating Pine Mountain Estates from Pines Ranch. 
(T-44, 
~ Q -
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49). As noted above, in October of 1975, Mr. Matheson put in a 
padlock and chain on the fence separating Section 34 from the 
Pine Mountain Estates lots and delivered keys to Pines Ranch and 
to the Stevens. (T-68,69). He was expressly asked it he gave 
any permission to any of the plaintiffs or copies or sets of 
keys to any of them to which he replied universally in the 
negative. (T-69). 
Finally, in the Statement of Facts, counsel wishes to 
call to the Court's attention the fact that just as Mr. Stevens 
testified that a "No Trespassing" sign appeared out at the Weber 
Canyon Highway bordering Section 33, so did Mr. Rogerson testify 
that at the main entrance to Pines Ranch at the north edge of 
Section 34, which faces the Weber Canyon Highway, a similar 
"No Trespassing" sign exists and has been in place for more than 
20 years. Mr. Rogerson further testified that admittedly there 
is not a "No Trespassing" sign at the gate or along the fence 
separating Section 34, the Pines Ranch property, from the Pine 
Mountain Estates property (Section 33) because "we expected 
no one else to use the property except the Stevens people and 
ourselves." (T-92,93). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE USE CLAIMED 
BY PLAINTIFFS WAS SPORADIC ONLY AND INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
SUCH REGULAR, OPEN, NOTORIOUS, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE 
USE AS TO ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION. 
Plaintiffs brought this action as a declaratory judg-
ment action (R-l) seeking to have the court declare that they 
are entitled to a right of way across the defendant's property, 
which they claim to have acquired by "20 years prescriptive use." 
(T-4). 
As to the proper rule of appellate review, we refer 
the court to the case of London Guarantee and Accident Co. vs. 
Frazee, at; 112 Ut 91, 185 P 2d 284 (1947), which involved an action 
for a declaratory judgment, and in that case, the Supreme Court 
of Utah held at page 96 that the rule of appellant review was 
as follows: 
"Our duty is to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court if, after a search of the record, we conclude 
there is substantial, competent evidence to sustain 
its findings. Even though we might have come to a 
different decision had we originally heard the action, 
we cannot now substitute our judgment for that of 
the trial court." 
In support of this, we cite the cases of Jensen v.Qerrard. 85 
Ut 481, 39 P 2d 1070 (1935) and Norback vs. Board of Directors, 
84 Ut 506, 37 P 2d 339 (1934), which are cases involving pre-
scriptive easements and in which the court held that prescriptive 
easement cases were in law. See, however, Richins v. Struhs, 
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17 Ut 2d 356, 412 P 2d 314 (1966) where the court proceeds in 
equity. It is, however, respectfully submitted that even under 
equitable principles of review the same result is inevitable 
in this case. 
The plaintiffs, throughout their Brief, frequently 
and freely assert that the plaintiffs established their prescrip-
tive easement by clear and undisputed testimony. We submit that 
a careful search of the record reveals that the plaintiffs' 
contentions are not only disputed by credible, competent, sub-
stantial evidence, but that plaintiffs1 own testimony, even if 
considered by itself, is anything but convincing or clear. We 
have canvassed the record carefully and submit that the following 
is a fair summary of all of the evidence which conceivably bears 
upon the use of the property in question by plaintiffs and their 
predecessors or privies and upon the question of ingress and 
egress by such persons across the property of the defendant: 
1. Plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, testified th^t he 
went on the property (with the person from whom he later purchased 
it) in 19 61, which was one year before he purchased the same. 
(T.-10) . 
2. George Q. Nielsen testified that he had the 
property surveyed in 1962 at the time he acquired it. (T-12). 
3. George Q. Nielsen testified, when asked what uses 
he had put the property to, as follows: "Well, we rode horses up 
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in there we have hired on many occasions. We b ^ o ou*- timber. 
We have taken out: trees, and W P ha* »T„" ml. Chris .- very 
yea.i", " (T-JJ). With reference to this statement , Nielsen Is 
not asked, nor does he state, how many times he used it noi .A/licit 
route of i fiqress MI 1 cciresj,;, nor11 1.1'H1 nieans n t transportation 
(except that one could perhaps in iff u- that ho went: by horseback 
at times. ) Nielsen does testify that ho used the gate e i !:J le 
iiorthwesl - I I hf p-i operty b e l o n g i n g to tne rxnes (entering 
through the Stevens property to get there. (T--17) v i La, reference 
to said supposed "road" , Nielsen si .r -. . . • page 1 \ of 
the t ranscript: 
"Q. i i ould yoi i please for the Court describe: : *. 
nature of the roadway, and I am looking *t ;9o2 
when you purchased the property. Describe the 
nature of the roadway from the time you crossed 
the Smith and Moorehouse stream unti 1 you got as 
close to your property as you could on the roadway. 
Tell us at the start of it. 
^ j t w a s a r e g U i a r canyon-type of rough dirt, 
graveled road that ran up that, ran up Shingle Mill, 
was clearly defined, and then it is true it never, 
going to my property was clearly defined but as 
you got to the edge of the Pines Ranch you could 
clearly see trails for a car and we have driven a 
car when we h a v e — Well, the fire department used, 
and we have driven a quarter-ton truck to get into 
it. The terrain became more of a trail'and you could 
see that they hauled timber out of there and driven 
wagons out of there, and I could get to my property 
>*, m y time wit' i four-wheel drive and with clearing 
: -* ' 1 - f-W :•>.. ; r-onl i *1: i v e ± c <J . *' 
If Nielsen drov ? i- **.* { -wheel drive' ^ *: cl € \ i i .1 :ci ( :1 le proper I: y 
-1 3_ 
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4. George Q. Nielsen testified that he went hunting 
in the area in 19 56 and 19 57, which was five years before he 
acquired the property. There is no testimony, however, that 
such vists were in any way authorized by the then owner. (T-19). 
5. Defendant, Ronald Harrington, testified that he 
had been on the property several times between 1971 and 1975. 
He testified that the first time he went in from the Pines north 
gate and that in May or June 1975 he came in over the Stevens 
property through the gate at the northwest corner twice. (T-42, 43). 
6. Robert C. Walsh testified that he had been to the 
area about one time each year from 19 36 to 19 52 to get Christmas 
trees. Walsh testified that he was a nephew of a former owner, 
but he admitted that he did not actually know the location of 
of the property, but assumed that they were on the proper tract 
in obtaining the Christmas trees. (T-54). 
7. Walsh also testified that he had been hunting in 
the area, but did not know whether he was on the property in 
question or not, nor did he testify that he was there by authority 
of the then owners. (T-54). 
8. William Ray Hauter testified that he was a lieu-
tenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department and co-worker 
of plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen. He testified that he went upon 
the property in question 6 or 7 times with Nielsen to obtain 
Christmas trees and to hunt grouse and testified that these visits 
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commenced approximately seven years ao. •*-•» testifier * ^  
had, gone 1: y " car as far as tl :i,,e cj,^ • • • 
not by car beyond (T-59, 61). In response t t:*-> quests, r fr- •. 
how far from the fence an automobile could be driven (going 
east) 1 i,e sai d at, page 61 of the transcript: 
' A „ We] ] , tl: i i s would be difficul t, There was an 
old roadway there. It appeared to be a roadway. 
It hadn't been used probably for vehicular traffic 
for sometime, '^u\ it was a road. Probably could 
have driven F» •--•:<;!--*: distance ~~ ^ ^ -—, 
This seems *-« ••/ontradict Nielsev ! testimony about goimi to the 
F r <•'- • : ' (Jii I MI M i l n\i «', in "in d m i »v i 'II I 
to have beer jso.Lar.od and remote. 
9 The -v.-jr-T '-•-:•;- !-:.^- objectio: s trie defendant, 
a-:A. j - ; .*: L ; . . : i ., . . Gibbons T^stimony 
this form is clear 1 inadmissible , ; would !•* prejudicial snd 
reversib] e error 1 * * - : 
Mrs. Gibbons was unable :. •*-' nc :> should 
have been secured 1 r deposu M P , assuming competency , 
defendanl s i lever 
there is no showing 1 •< ••K-ntc^ - rapanlr j* JI* time SAG md*-
the affidavit • *-,)\ nv^nt A -t- ,,* I,? •.. iffidav : uuc& 
inn.it e r i ri L I ' apparently 
concurred with U K • • >* n^ aft id<v <, ^  i *r »s :r,« issues 
of this lawsui t '*:• * concerned 
family used : ioadway .,_ i •• property * n purposes . taking 
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! 
out timber, grazing sheep, picnicking and other purposes. It 
further states that Ethel Gibbons personally used what she 
termed "Shinglemill Canyon Road" for in excess of 40 years. 
(see paragraphs 2 and 3 of the affidavit.) She does not, how-
ever, state in her affidavit what roadway she is referring to 
in paragraph 2, and although she does refer to the name of a 
roadway in paragraph 3 as being "Shinglemill Canyon Road", 
there is no way of determining what Ethel Gibbons understood 
to be the "Shinglemill Canyon Road" is it relates to a supposed
 ( 
prescriptive easement across the Pines Ranch. There is no way 
of determining what, in her mind, the situs of the road would 
be. Furthermore, although she states that she personally used 
this road for in excess of 40 years, we are not told what 40 
i 
years is meant, and we are not told when any such use began or j 
ended and we are not told if it was continuous and uninterrupted, 
nor whether it was regular, open or notorious. In fact, her 
entire affidavit is consistent with sporadic (and even permissive) 
use in any event. 
10. Milton Kenneth Rogerson, who was a part-owner of 
the Pines and a member of the Board of Directors, testified that 
he has been acquainted with the property in question since 1928 
and has been a part-owner of the defendant since 1940. (T-81) 
When asked regarding use prior to the mid-1960's, he stated, 
"Nobody used it without our permission." (T-113). He further 
stated at page 113 of the transcript: 
_1 £_ 
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"Q. :>iobod, or.) l o o t e d ? 
A. Yes , wt o b j e c t e d . 
Q . •:• -: ii . . ^ ; < o t ? 
A. Wo objeorod boruiise il w^s M ^ S . 
. Q. How d."i'J •• 01 on jo--4 :> 
A. 'iii'^ re was no r*j. airi- on i •*•-
MR. MADSEN: Let h ; o answer, • •oun.-r--.; . 
A.. There was i 10 purpose for anybody to go on our 
property. For whatever they used it for they would 
have to have used our property. That is the reason 
we objected. 
Q. How did you object? Did y o u w r i t. e i e 1t e r s / g o 
on the ground, ki ck tho--« r • f'"" 
A. We kicked them off if vvo saw them. 
3.1 „ The sard Roor^rsor a"'?. ••-'•>(* I'oaG'i '":^-'i ' • : '. • -.. -, a; 
far»r- i y had ;ise i the GiDooos propert:.;/ for sheen at some tini<* in 
the past, but that the slieep had boon hrouahi i r> from the south 
and had left by — - - -or ; hva-a. •:jat>..--. a--. • • o. , aj ;- . occurred 
since about 1^50 oa .1 ;:.; . furthermore, this reference to the 
Gibbons family was not to lithe}.. Gibbons and her ruoo • !- ' •, 
but r.^lio- -: rh- 'v:i)l:oo'~ i ,o : : as a ^aola,. Tt was . - f 'i)!)Oiis 
famrly x.o the larger sense that was referred to by Rogorsor and 
he stated that Albert, -./ho --'as ropresnt-.it t-./i. loo- r:-.- oooas 
fawKy, a in; ? i; 1 of..- o aoaaraon that he- had no right oi wa\o (T-105). 
There oas a i .JO testimony thai: the Gibbons family had u?' a wra»t. 
is referred to as the ";w-Gy, !-.v-adr" .- - M Liferent 
-1 7~ 
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1 
location to the alleged road in question in this lawsuit. It 
should be noted that even in connection with the testimony con-
cerning the ingress and egress of sheep, there is no testimony 
as to how often it was used and no basis upon which to establish 
a prescriptive easement by that activitiy, which has long since 
been abandoned in any event. 
12. The aforesaid Rogerson also testified that in 
approximately 19 65 he met the plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, on 
the premises and told him that he was trespassing. Plaintiff, 
Nielsen, in his testimony admitted the encounter, but denied 
portions of Rogerson's testimony in that regard. (T-93, 94, 116, 
and 122). 
13. The said Rogerson testified that the Gibbons family 
was a permissive user through the north gate on occasion. (T-104). 
14. Rogerson further testified with reference to the 
northwest gate of the Pines property, that owners to the west 
had used it to cross the Pines Ranch for purposes of keeping the 
canal to their premises cleared each year. As to its creation as 
a road, he testified that this was accomplished in 1956 by Mr. 
Wilde (T-83, 84), at which time Wilde obtained permission from 
the Pines to remove timber through their property and he cut 
the road for that purpose. The remains of that road are appar-
ently visible in the photographs admitted in evidence, but 
Rogerson testified that the so-called road as shown in the 
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photographs ended .lL»0 to 200 yards from the plaintiffs' 
property in any event. (T-89). He also testified that beyond 
that point' it was at most a game tra.'il. M«'j used the phrase 
1,1
 i ndications of animal traffic," (T-85, 89), Nielsen even 
characterized the supposed road as a "trail", (T-1'3). Harrington 
i'(iils it -i "patli1 iT-1/; v.;,i.isn rerers to a "trail", (T-55) bat 
isn't even sure of the Jocacion of zit-.- Gibhons property with 
reference thereto. Scott M. Math^s. ^  --T*
 : of the lots ]ust 
west of the gate, testified that even at its beginning, the so-
called road does not. appear to be a road, but rather just a few 
t: ire t r a c k s * ("I1 - 7 3) ., H e rni a 11 L n n d ,. a j; c i r t - o wi I e r o f th e P i n e s 
and the predecessor in interest of Matheson in the lots just to 
the west of the said gate, refers to the so-called road as a 
"fiotise-hrcif I "", (T K0) as does Stevens. (T-25). 
The prerequisites i n Utah to the establishment of a 
prescriptive easels n'-
 t : * • ^ ~ i ! \ *« • • < • * iiji,t>oxs 
v. Gerrard, supra, . -,M u.-iowijv, jj..^.dqe rounj az i>viqe - ;<" : 
' .-. "Before a r^j'.t J* way ca: *>• i-^j^irec' 1
 r prescription, 
the use for the prescriptive period most be peaceable, 
continuous, open, adverse as of right, and with the 
knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff and his 
grantors and predecessors in interest. Actual notice 
to the owner of the servient estate is not necessary 
if the user is so notorious that in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence the owner should learn thereof; 
',-.'.• then he will have constructive notice of the user 
which is sufficient.*' 
In tl le ligh t c >f these principles, ^ •. is abundantly 
clear that the plaintiffs totally fditrd irL their testimony LO 
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establish a prescriptive easement for at least the following 
reasons: 
1. The testimony totally fails to show a continuous, 
uninterrupted use for a period of 2 0 years. If the affidavit of 
Ethel Gibbons is excluded, as it should be, all that remains is 
an occasional use by George Q. Nielsen, Ronald Harrington and 
William Ray Hauter since 1962, which at best is a period of 14 
years. The testimony of Walsh's limited use likewise does not 
meet the 2 0-year requirement as it commenced in 1936 and ended 
in 19 52, a period of 16 years. The Walsh period and the Nielsen 
period are interrupted by ten years of non-use from 19 52 to 1962. 
Even if Ethel Gibbons1 testimony were admissible, it does not 
improve the situation because the period of her use is not 
identified in terms of time of beginning or ending, nor does 
her testimony establish that her use was continuous or regular, 
uninterrupted, open or notorious, or peaceable, or that defendant 
knew, or should have known, of such use. It also fails to identify 
the location or route used and how often such route or routes 
were used. 
2. In addition to failing to show 20 years continuous/ 
uninterrupted use, the use testified to is only incidental and 
sporadic in nature and is not such as to establish a prescriptive 
easement in any event. A review of the testimony of Nielsen, 
Harrington and Hauter does not show the kind of use which is 
-?.n-
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.. . ^ - i». • : ^ s t a L ; i i s i i a p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t , T h i s u s e o f 
•< h e p r o p e r t y *'£• oc- \ J S I . : : . J I -md t e m p o r a r y , ; ^ .d t h e y de " 'o «-"»--* 
.: :" -JOiisis* s_,r.' . . - * * • ] > ;• i , , = <,„ ,- ^. remov.:-; . : 
L a r j _ s t m a s i . i c e e a c h yo_:i . dvoi t h i s a c t i v i t y t a k e s p l a c e . a 
t h e wi: ; t - - . - r e c ;.k<. o c - ' u p a n t a o f i b v ' ' m o s f< • ie i < . *T.po.- 1 
1 ' ' •' . . , • • ; • ' . . i j ' . , \ ' ,AM'JL C"". t i-O dCtl . lLif . i5> Oi ^ l e t C a 
a n d oe r U m i y cann-A. bo s a i d t o h a v e b o o n awa r e t h e r e o l , e ^ ^ c t 
f o r t h e ->MO i n s t a n c e - - a a • T aee.- • «. •'•dd'i-"''-* ' ' ] ' ' -: j ^ ~ n 
c ;•. o[ r . v a:. ; a.. 10 ! H , • aa*, n-r v o s " r e s p a s s i a "J * b b e 
a c t i v i t y o* Walsh .-; l i k e w i s e o f a s p o r a d i c n a t u r e u n i y a n a 
amountr; t o a o i nq on 1.1 tm» p r o p c n y <m l i m e p e r y e a r t o r e m o v e 
a Ch- ^.,;t 1 I- c ; i'id t a • - a/„ s u b . . i i . : o t s u r f i c i e m ^ T i v x t y 
t o e s t a h ! 1 <r. a u r ^ ^ ""-ipt : a^ c a s ^ n H v * • • ^ ' - -
affid n . 1. . >-* f c . -I iO i \ i r . v wr» J C< a o a l d 
b e r e q u j i - . . t*> esxa ib ] 1 s h .. p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e r a n t b e e a a -
d o e s K't n : h . \ » t " • J n t t h e a c ; d -' . - j - a . . , r 
a f f i e 1,
 t . i ^ i . . L C , c a n i n c d d e i i t . * ! : J ; t o n p a i a r y in a <ti:ra 
•
;
 i n a j i y , i t b n o a i t i n., e b a - i v e c t .n.i t evt ; r ' s * 
u s a g ^ t e s t i f i e d t o h-~- id- r-i .j e : t . f - -. — - •: * 1 : CK-P.* r- .. . K . 1 
"•.
 : ih j r. ac'_e c a s e , M LS d i r : r L l v c o n t r a d j c t e d by t h e t L ^ t i i ^ : i j \ r 
• " Mid ban K e n n e t h R o g e r s o n . "He t e s t j f i e d I'P.IZ a a v ., .< i 
t h e mj .d - j . ' ; ' * -- - :• - - ' c a ^ ^ -'a--> • > - S M L C U r h .d . : L t h e y to i .no 
p e o p l e on .,,<. p i .opcf . ty w i t h o u t po rnu .-a; b.-n t h e y t o i \ i t a •; -..o 
l e a v e . T r u e , of CUUJLSC, c r e a t e s a £ ; * : ; 
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conflicting testimony and under general rules of appellate 
review, the decision of the trial court in this regard will 
not be overturned. 
The general rule is well established that in order to 
obtain a prescriptive easement, the use must be continuous and 
uninterrupted, and this means it must have substance and signifi-
cance. Whereas it is true that "what shall constitute such conti-
nuity can be stated only with reference to the nature and character 
of the right claimed", it is nevertheless equally clear that a 
prescriptive easement cannot be acquired by "occasional and 
sporadic acts for temporary purposes". The foregoing language 
is taken from 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements, §56. The reason for this, 
at least in part, is that the use must have sufficient substance 
and magnitude that the owner of the fee can reasonably be charged 
with knowledge thereof. A prescriptive easement cannot be obtained 
by stealth. In Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Ut 514, 175 P 2d 714 (1947) 
the court at page 522 states that it is important to know "whether 
the servient estate owner knew of should have known during the 
entire prescriptive period that the claimant was using the claimed 
right of way." (Emphasis added.) 
In their Brief, plaintiffs cite the case of Cooper v. 
Carter Oil Co., 7 Ut 2d 9, 316 P 2d 320 (1957) in which the Supreme 
Court of Utah found adverse possession under circumstances which 
consisted of grazing sheep upon the land in question for three 
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• '.-«,; /u ~he y^a"^, TA7<^  d~ ^^4- thin1: *hau thr-et* car>>- supports 
•"i? plaintiffs' position ai i!: i i * • .-,f ail, it doeb no' 
wltl 1 a pre - • j-t ;<• ^ .---ii( , j A ; -• , .orp, under the orciir.!-
stances of thr oas< . tne evidence disclosed that the . Mid ,v ~; 
graz LIV; . ' ,! ewi i -: - * '• > o --r/\ *" thereon ^ « : - e 
wee,1 ° ' * *; * : , re . ; . : \ K ' . , ^ e was on •, Mirce 
weeks pe> v ;r/ ^r did, • M . const >tut^ 10 0% use e. • ^ "v 
propel \- ii idle j-iibtaiiL. o,i -,* ' • ' . . • -
i •• . ; :j-..riy approaching three weeks per year. Litt]- more nas 
been don< w ; * h the property than to o^ "as iona ' > *- remove a • • •'•--
at Liu '-' s r r T! «e , - - • r; "o liy i-:r 
y e a r r^ •. , - \ o 1 hi. wi n e e r t i m ^ uuori r- o w much i s uix'no ^eta / 
f u r t h e r m o r e , * q<
 r , , r ^ e n o * e v e n 20 u o n l ; 
t l i e ' . H I i o • > '-*<. i , , - • 
F u r the-*- he p l a i n f i i* f<" reive r.ui»di v < d r d t h e r r o p o r t y 
i n q u e s t i o n I U L G B f i v e - a c / " * e... ' • i.- - , /•. j * < t : i e r e 
i . . .- --., l e n c e w h a t s o e v e r i n t h i s r e c o r d th- t 1 a n y o n e o v e r r^l^p:, 
if; much <:e- ^i? n i q h t o»i t h e i r p r o p o r t v D i a i r 4 ' f r ^ ?~ • *u 
establ. -1 'rfJ i < . M:;O . , > U . . i b i o r , 
?
 - *; : n , o r - ! IK- 1 a* 1 ~>J a "iv -,ri - .*- t - t a r n t o a r o and 
' ' fri'1 ' e • -.i o , :.,unimer hr r.e u s e f*^ ~ ro^-> e x a c t l y 
i s a Si , ' • • • * •" * .
 ; ^ •.-;'• p a s t b^u v% i i u n e l d 
t o b ^ ^ n r o a d u y o c c a s i o n a l ^ t e m p o r e 
F i n a l l y , i t s h o u l d N *>nr J r • ! - . - . • - c i r 
•M -. s p o r a t i c (P1 ? in t i : f;, * r-r i r :. . i 4 ) 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING THAT IN 
RECENT YEARS THE USE MADE OF THE ALLEGED RIGHT OF WAY 
WAS ESSENTIALLY PERMISSIVE AND THAT DEFENDANT HAS MADE 
EVERY ATTEMPT IT COULD TO KEEP PEOPLE FROM TRESPASSING 
ACROSS ITS LAND. 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that in 
recent years the use made of the alleged right of way has been 
essentially permissive, and that defendant has made every attempt 
it could to keep people from trespassing across its land. (R-35). 
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and we cite par-
ticularly the following items: 
1. Since at least 1940, there has been a gate and fence 
alonq the west boundary of the Pines Ranch to control access. 
(T-85) . 
2. There is a locked gate on the north boundary of 
the Pines and "No Trespassing" sign. (T-49, 50,92, 104). 
3. Rogerson found plaintiff, George Q. Nielsen, on 
the premises in about 1965 and complained to him that he was tres-
passing. (T-93, 94, 122). 
4. Rogerson testified that prior to the mid-19601s 
no one entered the premises without permission and if persons were 
found on the property without permission, they were "kicked off". 
(T-113) . 
5. Wilde constructed the road and used it to remove 
timber during one season, all with permission of defendant. (T--83, 84), 
6. Rogerson testified that the Gibbons family were 
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permissive users through the north and that the family spokes-
man acknowledged that the Gibbons had no right of way, (T-104, 105) 
7. All of the foregoing actions must be considered 
in the light of the measures taken by the Stevens family and 
their successors on the west to prevent access to their property, 
all of which has resulted in cutting off access to the defendant's 
west boundary. But for the measures taken by the Stevens family, 
more severe measures by defendant would perhaps have been appro-
priate as defendant might reasonably have been required to antici-
pate trespassers from the west. It should be noted that the 
Stevens people: 
(a) Maintained a fence and locked gate across the 
north of their property for
 at least the last 25 years. (T-9 ). 
(b) Keys were given to those entitled to them, but 
not to plaintiffs. (T-34). 
(c) The area to the west of the Pines gate has been 
subdivided and sold to Matheson, who has put a locked chain 
across the gate. (T-66-69). 
Without arguing the matter further, it appears clear 
that the record contains more than enough evidence to support the 
aforesaid finding of the Court and, in fact, compels the finding 
as set out in Point IV above. 
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POINT III. THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THIS CASE'' " 
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN RICHINS V. STRUHS. 
In its Memorandum Decision,the trial court held that 
this case does not fall within the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the case of Richins v. Struhs, supra. In this, the trial 
court was correct. The real issue in the Richins case was 
whether the use was permissive or not permissive. As we read 
it, that case stands for the proposition that when a claimant 
has shown that his use has been open, notorious and continuous 
for more than 20 years, i;hat the "law presumes that the use is 
adverse to the owner; and that it had a legitimate origin11, 
(page 359). That case, therefore, does not do away with the 
requirement that the use be open, notorious, continuous and 
adverse for over 20 years. That is still a condition precedent. 
In the instant case, that requirement was never met and, there-
fore, the presumption never comes into effect. Furthermore, 
the presumption is rebuttable, and under the circumstances of 
this case, it is respectfully submitted that any such presump-
tion has been fully rebutted in any event. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT DENY PLAINTIFFS 
ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY NOR RENDER IT WORTHLESS. 
In Point IV of their Brief, plaintiffs make a very 
emotional appeal that the trial court has denied them access 
to their property and rendered it worthless. That is absurd. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court has only ruled, and properly so, that plaintiffs 
failed to prove a prescriptive easement. If plaintiffs1 property 
is worthless without a prescriptive easement, it was not the 
decision of the Court that brought it about. If such is the 
case, it was worthless before the Court ruled, as the Court 
only declared the status between the parties in a declaratory 
judgment action. It appears, however, that plaintiffs can obtain 
access to their property by eminent domain pursuant to Section 
78-34-1(7), Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. They will, 
of course, have to pay the reasonable value thereof, and the 
right of way will have to be placed on the ground in a location 
which will do the minimum of damage to defendant. 
-27-
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In Point IV of their Brief, plaintiffs appear to com-
plain that defendant is allowing livestock to graze on plaintiffs' 
subdivision. The record does not support that as a bona fide 
complaint, but if indeed it is, there are proper means to deal 
with it, but not in an action seeking a prescriptive easement. 
Also in Point IV, plaintiffs raise the issue of what 
was paid for their property. Nielsen did not know the principal 
amount that he paid for the land (T-21) and even if it were the 
$7,000 total that he did refer to, there is no evidence that the 
resulting cost of the land of $175 per acre for the 40 acres was 
a reasonable price with right of way, but not without. For all 
the record shows, the $175 per acre price was based upon lack of 
right of way and, in fact, it may be at a level which contemplates 
an additional expenditure for a right of way. It may indeed be 
the plaintiffs who would be getting the "windfall" if the trial 
court were to be reversed. 
Plaintiffs allege in Point IV that defendant is guilty 
of taking "all they can take, giving nothing in return." That 
is a totally unfounded and irresponsible statement. If anyone 
is trying to get something for nothing in this case, it would 
appear to be the plaintiffs. They are attempting, on the basis 
of isolated, sporadic, and really inconsequential contacts with 
the property (involving mainly the removal of an occasional 
Christmas tree<—accomplished on foot or at most perhaps some-
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times by horseback) to subject defendant's property to a full-
fledged right of way for motor vehicles to service a subdivision 
of eight lots for summer home use for who knows how many people. 
This is not fair play and it is not the law.. Even if there were 
a right of way, the owner thereof cannot increase the burden on 
the servient estate, and in the event of subdivision of the domi-
nant estate, the easement does not inure to the benefit of the 
owner of a parcel which, after the division, does not abut on the 
way. The Utah cases so hold. In this case, the evidence did not 
show right of way even going to the 40-acre tract as a unit, and 
it certainly does not show that it went to each of the eight 
five-acre tracts which have been subdivided from the orginal. 
Undeniably, eight summer homes will constitute an increased bur-
den under any circumstances. In support of the foregoing, we 
refer the court to the following cases: Wood v., Ashley, 122 Ut 
580, 253 P 2d 351 (1952); and Nielsen v. Sandberg, 1Q5 Ut 93, 
141 P 2d 696 (1943). 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower 
court is fully supported by the evidence, that the decision is 
a fair and just one, and respectfully pray that the Supreme 
Court affirm the decision of the trial court. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1976. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to Richard 
Richards, attorney for plaintiffs, at his address, 2506 Madison 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid, this day 
of August, 1976. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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